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PARAMETRIC PAYOUTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION:
HOW A TECH-BASED INSURANCE POLICY COULD PAVE THE WAY
FOR ECONOMICALLY VIABLE CONSERVATION EFFORTS
Hannah M. Petersen*
This year, the state government of Quintana Roo, Mexico, the
Nature Conservancy, and the reinsurance company, Swiss Re,
created the first parametric insurance policy to be taken out on a
natural resource; the Mesoamerican Reef. This innovative policy
creates a technology-based approach to establishing economically
viable environmental conservation by assigning a quantitative value
to a vulnerable resource that protects the $10 billion tourism
industry in the Caribbean. It also creates an entirely new and
unregulated subsector of the insurance field. Although this type of
policy sets the stage for innovative environmental conservation
efforts, parameters and payout mechanisms might not align to
achieve efficient or fair results without regulation or government
oversight. Adopting standards like those present in the regulation of
private green bonds should be the first step in approaching
regulation because it would allow for the industry to grow while
holding companies accountable. However, if the insurance policies
are going to effectively ensure environmental conservation,
nationally recognized and legally enforceable regulation will have
to follow the implementation of private standards.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Mesoamerican coral reef, in the Caribbean Sea, is the
world’s second-longest barrier reef and spans the coastlines of
Mexico, Honduras, Belize, and Guatemala.1 The reef provides
numerous environmental benefits, ranging from housing one of the
most diverse ecosystems in the world to providing marine resources

1

See
Mesoamerican
Reef
Facts,
WORLD
WILDLIFE
FUND,
https://www.worldwildlife.org/places/mesoamerican-reef (last visited Oct. 29,
2018).
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that yield a strong tourism industry.2 Arguably more significant,
however, is the reef’s ability to protect coastal communities from
powerful storm surges and climate disasters.3 When healthy, a coral
reef can significantly reduce wave energy before the wave hits the
coastal shore, providing a defense to onshore development from
damages caused by storm winds and wave currents.4 This function
provides incredible environmental and economic benefits to coastal
states such as Mexico’s Quintana Roo, which is a part of the tenbillion-dollar tourism industry that is dependent upon functional
beaches and marine life.5
Unfortunately, over the past few years this natural defense
mechanism has been threatened by “[f]looding, erosion, inundation,
and extreme weather events,” that have drastically degraded
infrastructure, tourism, and trade.6 This has led to extreme negative
effects on both local and national economies.7 Weather-related
economic losses have increased nearly four-fold between the year
1980 and today, and more than $560 billion in insurance has been
2

Mesoamerican
Reef,
WORLD
WIDE
FUND
FOR
NATURE,
http://www.wwfca.org/en/species_and_places/mesoamerican_reef/ (last visited
Oct. 26, 2018).
3
See Insuring Nature to Ensure a Resilient Future: Can a New Fund in Mexico
Create a First-Ever Insurance Policy on Nature?, NATURE CONSERVANCY (Mar.
8, 2018), https://global.nature.org/content/insuring-nature-to-ensure-a-resilientfuture [hereinafter Insuring Nature] (stating that in 2005, Mexico’s coast was hit
by two hurricanes that caused extensive damage to the whole coast, but the area
protected by the Mesoamerican coral reef, Puerto Morelos, experienced
significantly less damage).
4
See id. (“A healthy coral reef can reduce up to 97 percent of a wave’s energy
before it hits the shore.”).
5
See Mark Tercek, Business to the Rescue! Insurance for Reef Restoration,
NATURE CONSERVANCY (Mar. 8, 2018), https://global.nature.org/content/busine
ss-to-the-rescue-insurance-for-reef-restoration.
6
See Insuring Nature, supra note 3; WEALTH ACCOUNTING AND VALUATION
OF ECONOMIC SERVICES AND WORLD BANK GROUP, MANAGING COASTS WITH
NATURAL SOLUTIONS: GUIDELINES FOR MEASURING AND VALUING THE COASTAL
PROTECTION SERVICES OF MANGROVES AND CORAL REEFS 9 (2016),
https://thought-leadership-production.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/02/12/15/46/09/
e53a750a-c2fc-4cec-beba-edebea0222b6/Technical%20Rept%20WAVES%20
Coastal%202-11-16%20web%20(1).pdf [hereinafter Managing Coasts with
Natural Solutions].
7
See Managing Coasts with Natural Solutions, supra note 6, at 9.

78

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.

[VOL. 20: 75

paid out between 1980 and 2015.8 The increase in storm surges,
vulnerability of natural barriers, and threats to the economy9 have
led local governments and environmental groups to collaborate and
create an innovative solution that could lay the framework for the
future of technological solutions to environmental disasters.10
The Nature Conservancy, alongside the State Government of
Quintana Roo, has teamed up with Swiss Re, an insurance company,
to create the first ever parametric insurance program11 for a natural
See Climate Change and Risk Disclosure, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS
(July 11, 2018), https://naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_climate_risk_disclosure.htm;
see also Managing Coasts with Natural Solutions, supra note 6, at 9 (“Insurers
have paid out more than $300 billion just for coastal damages from storms in the
past 10 years, which often goes toward rebuilding similar coastal infrastructure
that is still vulnerable to coastal storms and flooding.”).
9
See, e.g., Nicole Chavez, Hurricane Maria Killed 2,975 People in Puerto
Rico. It’s The Second Deadliest US Storm In Over a Century, CNN (Aug. 29,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/29/us/puerto-rico-deaths-new-york-9-11trnd/index.html; ‘Beryl’ Strengthens, Expected To Hit Caribbean As Hurricane,
WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/beryl-strengthensexpected-to-hit-caribbean-as-hurricane-1530896268; Janice Dean, Hurricane
Florence Could Be One Of The Worst Hurricanes to Ever Hit The East Coast,
FOX NEWS (Sept. 11, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2018/09/11/hurricaneflorence-could-be-one-worst-hurricanes-to-ever-hit-east-coast.html; LAUNCH OF
THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT TRUST, NATURE CONSERVANCY 1,
https://thought-leadershipproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/2018/03/08/14/23/46/1ac3a4be-11d2-46519d98-50326d81e1b8/TNC_Mexico_CoastalManagementTrust_Factsheet.pdf
(last visited Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Coastal Zone Management Trust] (“Past
storm events have closed hotels and businesses for long periods, cutting off
income and employment until they can be repaired and reopened.”).
10
The increased vulnerability of coastal areas has fostered an environment
where The Nature Conservancy, the State Government of Quintana Roo, Mexico,
hotels and local business owners, and local scientists have partnered together to
create a trust that will receive taxes from the tourism industry and other funds
from The Rockefeller Foundation in order to provide financial support to a
conservation plan taken out on the Mesoamerican reef near Puerto Morelos, a
town in Quintana Roo. See Insuring Nature, supra note 3.
11
Parametric insurance differs from traditional insurance because the payout is
triggered by the occurrence of predetermined contractual terms rather than a
damage assessment made after the event. For example, a parametric insurance
plan could state that if wave velocity during a storm reaches a certain amount, a
payout would be issued, rather than waiting until after the storm subsides and the
actual damages are assessed. This increases efficiency and allows the insured
8

DEC. 2018]Parametric Payouts and Environmental Conservation

79

resource.12 The program is backed by the Coastal Zone Management
Trust (the Trust), which receives funding from the tourism industry,
the Rockefeller Foundation, and payouts by the local government.13
The Trust will fund the continuous maintenance of the reef14 and the
purchase of the parametric insurance.15 Not only will maintaining
the reef protect the tourism industry in Quintana Roo, but it will also
“bolster economic resilience of the region; encourage conservation
of a valuable natural asset; and create a scalable new market for the
insurance industry—a model which could be applied to other
regions and ecosystems.”16
The parametric structure of the insurance policy uses technology
to create an economically efficient way to implement environmental
restoration. Parametric insurance, unlike traditional insurance,
issues a payout to the insured based on a trigger, rather than an
assessment of the damage caused by an event.17 The parametric plan
adopted for the Mesoamerican reef uses the trigger of wind speed
hitting the reef.18 Research has shown that coral reefs fail to recover
properly after a Category Four or Five hurricane, and, therefore, the
insurance plan has established the parametric trigger of wind speed
aligning with a Category Four hurricane—around 110 knots.19 In
short, when the wind hits this predetermined speed in the area near
the reef, an automatic payout is made to the local government so that
party to begin making the repairs needed. See Andre Martin, What Is Parametric
Insurance?,
SWISS
RE
CORP.
SOLS.
(Aug.
1,
2018),
https://corporatesolutions.swissre.com/insights/knowledge/what_is_parametric_i
nsurance.html.
12
Coastal Zone Management Trust, supra note 9, at 3.
13
See Insuring Nature, supra note 3 (explaining that funding comes through
taxes from the tourism industry, government funds, and support from the
Rockefeller Foundation).
14
The reef will be maintained through rescuing broken corals, gathering larvae
and allowing them to grow in a safe environment before reattaching to the reef,
managing fishing activity, putting in artificial structures for the coral to grow back
upon, and simply reattaching pieces of coral that have been detached by the storm.
See Coastal Zone Management Trust, supra note 9, at 4.
15
See id. at 3.
16
See Insuring Nature, supra note 3.
17
See Tercek, supra note 5.
18
See id.
19
See id.; Coastal Zone Management Trust, supra note 9, at 3.
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it can begin repair and restoration of the natural resource without
waiting for a damage assessment and without having to allocate
funds to other costs that would be lumped together under a
traditional insurance plan.20 This payout is made regardless of storm
predictions, and the plan does not have to deal with the uncertainty
of weather patterns, because the payout is issued when the actual
wind speed is measured to be the predetermined amount.21 The local
government will receive the payout within days because scientists
have concluded that coral needs immediate attention for it to recover
effectively.22
This parametric insurance program not only benefits the
industries protected by the reef, but it also assists environmental
advocates who now have a mechanism to make environmental
restoration economically feasible.23 As the first implementation of
parametric insurance applied to a natural resource, this program sets
the stage for future economically feasible environmental
protection.24
The Mesoamerican reef parametric insurance program also
provides an opportunity to detail the legal uncertainties surrounding
the creation of a new market within the insurance industry. Lack of
20

See Coastal Zone Management Trust, supra note 9, at 3 (explaining that the
insurance policy is strictly for the payouts associated with windspeed rather than
any other type of damage, fees, or activities that are associated with traditional
insurance plans).
21
See id. (stating that the technology measuring the trigger is in the area of the
reef and all that matters is whether the trigger is met, not whether the actual
insured asset is damaged).
22
See Adele Peters, This Coral Reef Will Have Its Own Innovative Insurance
Policy, FASTCOMPANY (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/
40452568/this-coral-reef-now-has-its-own-innovative-insurance-policy (quoting
Kathy Baughman McLeod, the managing director of climate risk and investment
at The Nature Conservancy in saying that “[t]he corals break off and you’ve got
to pick them up, and rest them, and they have to be reattached. That can all happen,
but they can’t be left to break off and float away, because they’ll die and you’ll
lose the health of the reef.”).
23
See Coastal Zone Management Trust, supra note 9, at 3 (explaining that
environmentalists will now be able to demonstrate “the value of nature as a costeffective way of protecting people and property from flood and storm damage
related to climate change”).
24
See Insuring Nature, supra note 3.
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regulation, differences in technological standards, and the
application of a new type of insurance inside a traditional insurance
legal regime pose significant legal consequences without providing
guidance on how to resolve them. Further, industry predictions
suggest that insurance plans, and more specifically parametric
insurance plans, will be more effective if they are grounded on smart
contracts.25 As an inherently effective platform for smart contracts,
emerging blockchain technology is predicted to be a strong presence
in the insurance field.26 Because of this predicted trend and because
it is the first policy taken out on a natural resource, the
Mesoamerican parametric insurance program provides an
opportunity to analyze the legal complications of technology-based
insurance and consider why both private and public regulation
should be implemented.
This recent development argues that parametric insurance
should follow the regulatory regime of green bonds, where private
industry standards have shaped broader government regulation in
order to provide structure and terms that a court can follow. Part II
will explain the emerging field of parametric insurance. Part III will
analyze the successes and pitfalls of the few parametric insurance
plans that have previously been implemented as well as discuss
technology-based solutions to the current complications that have
emerged. Part IV will explain why the traditional insurance legal
regime is insufficient for parametric insurance plans and should be
supplemented through private and public regulatory standards.
Finally, Part V will discuss why this proposed regulation should
mirror that of green bonds.

25

Mark Carter, Parametric Insurance: Breaking the Mold of Traditional
Insurance,
IBM:
INDUS.
INS.
BLOG
(Jan.
22,
2018),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/insights-on-business/insurance/parametricinsurance-breaking-the-mold-of-traditional-insurance/. A smart contract is
defined as “an agreement in digital form that is self-executing and self-enforcing.”
Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 320
(2017).
26
See Carter, supra note 25.
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II. THE EMERGING FIELD OF PARAMETRIC INSURANCE: WHAT
IT IS AND HOW IT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN CATASTROPHIC
RISK SITUATIONS
Parametric insurance is based on “the probability of a predefined
event happening instead of indemnifying actual loss incurred.”27 The
plan is based on two elements: (1) a triggering event, and (2) a
payout mechanism that is both predetermined and custom-created to
ensure equity between the cost and the payout.28 Once the triggering
event occurs, a payout is made instantaneously, 29 allowing the
insurance holder to begin to make repairs to her property without the
time consuming indemnification process.30 Natural phenomena such
as earthquakes, floods, precipitation levels, or wind speeds are the
most common types of triggering events, but power outages, crop
yield, and other intangible market factors have also been used.31
Anything that is “fortuitous” and “can be modelled” will be an
effective trigger.32 The classification and enumeration of the
parameters,33 however, is what makes a truly efficient parametric
insurance scheme.34 The parameters are of heightened significance
because they are the focus of the insurance plan, rather than the
27

Martin, supra note 11.
See id.
29
For the Mesoamerican reef project, “[the] claim will be paid in 10 days or
less” because of the vulnerability of coral and the quick time frame necessary for
effective restoration. See Peters, supra note 22. This quick timeframe is one of the
key benefits of parametric insurance because it fosters protection of assets that
normally need rapid attention. See id.
30
See Martin, supra note 11.
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
For purposes of the insurance policy, the “parameter” is the index associated
with the insured loss meaning, or in layman’s terms the circumstances of the
trigger (e.g., temperature, wind speed). See, e.g., AXA Launches AXA Global
Parametrics, AXA (Mar. 9, 2017), https://group.axa.com/en/newsroom/pressreleases/axa-launches-axa-global-parametrics (stating these parameters must be
developed through balancing the potential of risk occurring and the recognition
of data on an appropriate threshold for a payout).
34
Denise Johnson, Experts See Expanding Role for Parametric Insurance,
Including
for
U.S.
Disasters,
INS.
J.
(Nov.
22,
2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/11/22/472010.ht
m.
28
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damage accrued or the actual asset.35 The parameters are effectively
replacing the human conducted damage assessment processes and
are basing the amount of a payout on previously collected data
regarding storm damage costs, predictions of storm likelihood, and
how much recovery would cost.36
Because the payouts are automatic, parametric insurance
programs function best when a third party who truly understands the
risks at stake is conducting the measurements of the trigger.37 The
customization and instantaneous payouts allow for a cheaper and
more flexible insurance policy that can be applied yearly or for the
short-term period that risk is actually present, such as hurricane
season or a cyclical period of drought.38 Because of this, parametric
insurance plans provide an incentive for the insured to create an
insurance policy for difficult-to-insure natural resources or
intangible business concepts.39 Creating insurance policies for these
resources not only creates a new sector of the insurance field, but
also creates an economically feasible way to justify the importance
of conservation to government and business leaders who have
previously refused to recognize the value of nature40—something

35

See id.
See id.
37
See id. (explaining that entities like the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration can issue measurements on wind speed that can both be used as a
historical framework for the policy, but also as the parametric triggers
themselves).
38
See id. (stating that a purchaser can adopt a parametric insurance plan for
short periods such as hurricane season or times that are historically related to
lower yielding crops).
39
See id.
40
See Insuring Nature, supra note 3 (“Coral reefs also provide significant
coastal protection benefits to nations around the world. If just the top 1 meter of
a coral reef is lost, annual expected damages from global flooding doubles. With
billions of dollars of built capital protected by coral reefs from flooding around
the world, it’s clear that there is a market ripe for financial products and
mechanisms that would protect reefs and ensure greater coastal resilience. More
importantly, it’s clear that lives and livelihoods are at stake. Recent research
suggests hurricanes could become more intense in the future, putting coastal
communities at even greater risk. We can’t afford to do nothing—literally.”).
36
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environmental advocates have struggled to do in the past. 41 This
working relationship between economics and conservation helps
both natural resources and threatened ecosystems by establishing the
quantifiable worth of the natural asset.42 To quantify the worth,
parties will not only consider the risk of damage, but also the value
of preserving the asset protected.43 Once the worth is quantified
through the assigned contract payout prices, environmental
advocates and scientists will be more effective in requesting
maintenance funds, which will allow the resource to recover rather
than deteriorate.44 This relationship is sufficiently depicted in the
Mesoamerican reef program, where assigning a numerical worth of
the reef provides a monetary incentive to restore the reef as damage
occurs before the entire resource is diminished of use.45
41

See Tercek, supra note 5 (“Environmentalists have long argued that
preserving reefs, wetlands, forests, and other natural ecosystems will provide
important services to people, from improving air and water quality to reducing the
onshore impact of storms. But now people like me have a powerful new ally on
our side—business leaders and deal-makers.”).
42
See Insuring Nature, supra note 3 (explaining that by establishing a payout
price through the insurance plan, the parties are assigning a quantifiable number
associated with value to a natural asset which traditionally can only be talked
about in qualitative environmental terms).
43
See id. For example, the Mesoamerican reef lies between the ocean storms
and a $10 billion tourism industry, so the value of that protection is factored into
the cost and payouts associated with the insurance. Id.
44
See Coastal Zone Management Trust, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that one of
the stakeholders in the coral reef insurance program, the Nature Conservancy, has
“demonstrated the value of nature as a cost-effective way of protecting people and
property from flood and storm damage related to climate change” through projects
like this insurance program and others that revolve around preservation and
restoration); see also Mark Tercek, The Best Investment Opportunity Ever:
Investing in Nature 101, NATURE CONSERVANCY (Nov. 4, 2017),
https://www.nature.org/en-us/about-us/who-we-are/our-people/mark-tercek/thebest-investment-opportunity-ever-investing-in-nature-101/
(“These
natural
solutions can be great investments. Often, they work just as well as—or even
better than—traditional manmade infrastructure. They often cost less. And they
usually deliver important co-benefits for free—things like habitat for plants and
animals, green space in underserved neighborhoods and opportunities for
recreation and tourism.”).
45
See Tercek, supra note 5 (stating that although coral reefs will recover from
storm events naturally, the funds are needed to take immediate recovery steps
including decreasing the water pollution around the reef, reintroducing fish
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As seen through storm event news coverage in the
Mesoamerican area,46 losses covered in parametric catastrophe
insurance policies can be extensive and global in nature, creating a
scheme that is difficult for a single party to cover.47 Therefore,
insurance companies take out reinsurance to diversify the losses
associated with the larger contracts.48 “Reinsurance can be
understood simply as insurer’s insurance,” and is a mechanism for
transferring risk.49 The contracts created with a reinsurer are
indemnity agreements,50 not obligations to pay the individual
obtaining the original insurance policy.51 Catastrophe reinsurance is
typically established through an aggregate occurrence contract,
which pays for losses in all contracts caused by the same natural
occurrence such as a hurricane.52 For example, when a hurricane
strikes a coastal neighborhood, the harm may be small to the
individual, but the aggregate harm felt by the neighborhood might
be an unmanageable loss for the primary insurance company. 53
Because reinsurance delves into the protection of aggregate harm,
having reinsurance “provides incentives for the primary insurers to
engage in mitigation and prevention of catastrophe losses.”54 This is
species around the reef, and introducing artificial infrastructure for the reef to
grow upon).
46
See Insuring Nature, supra note 3 (“In 2005, Mexico’s Caribbean coast was
struck by two hurricanes, causing USD$8 billion in damages and closing hotels
and other businesses in Cancún long enough to cause further economic impact.”).
47
Qihao He, Regulation by Government-Sponsored Reinsurance in
Catastrophe Management, 23 CONN. INS. L.J. 291, 295 (2017).
48
See id.
49
Id. at 293.
50
Indemnity agreements are:
[A]n obligation by one party to make another whole for a loss that the
other party has incurred. . . . Indemnity is a form of compensation in
which a first party is liable to pay a second party for a loss or damage
which the second party incurs to a third party. Indemnity requires that a
common duty be mutually owed to a third party.
41 AM. JUR. 2D, Indemnity § 1 (2018).
51
JOHN T. HARDING, MASSACHUSETTS LIABILITY INSURANCE MANUAL
§ 6.2 (3d ed. 2017).
52
GRAYDON S. STARING & HON. DEAN HANSELL, LAW OF REINSURANCE § 2:7
(2018).
53
See Harding, supra note 51, at § 6.3.
54
He, supra note 47, at 298.
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beneficial to programs like the one on the Mesoamerican reef
because conservation through maintenance and mitigation of the
natural resource protects the ten billion-dollar tourism industry as
well as the actual land shoreward of the reef.55
III. PAST PARAMETRIC INSURANCE PROGRAMS: THE SUCCESSES
AND FAILURES OF PREVIOUS PARAMETRIC REGIMES AND WHAT
THEY SUGGEST WOULD BE AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION
Although the Mesoamerican reef is the first parametric
insurance plan taken out on a natural resource, there are a growing
amount of parametric insurance plans actually in use today. Despite
this expanding presence, no parametric insurance claim has been
litigated for a determination of legal implications.56 As a unique
subsector of insurance, it is plausible that claims and issues cannot
and would not be handled the same way as the traditional insurance
regime. Therefore, a discussion of past projects, successes and
failures is useful in determining why regulation for this specific type
of industry is necessary.
A. Current Parametric Programs’ Approach to Triggers and
Payouts
As an example of another parametric program, Swiss Re has a
parametric insurance product that protects Japanese corporations
and public organizations from tsunamis using the trigger of wave
heights.57 In this policy, individual Japanese insurance buyers will
receive payouts on coverage between 30 and 100 million dollars
55

See Insuring Nature, supra note 3; see also About Us, SWISS RE, (2018)
http://www.swissre.com/about_us/ (stating that Swiss Re is a reinsurance
provider that deals directly with insurance companies, larger corporations, and
public sector clients).
56
Simon Konsta, Parametric Insurance has an Important Role in Building
Resilience Against Natural Disasters, CLYDE & CO (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/parametric-insurance-has-an-importantrole-in-building-resilience-against-n.
57
Swiss Re Launches Parametric Tsunami Derivative for Japanese Businesses,
ARTEMIS (Aug. 2, 2018), http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2018/08/02/swiss-relaunches-parametric-tsunami-derivative-for-japanese-businesses/ (explaining
that the wave height trigger was established using data validated by the Japan
Meteorological Agency).
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within 40 days of the tsunami striking the coastline.58 The policy was
derived after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake precipitated a tsunami
that was more than 40 meters high and reached 10 kilometers inland,
causing damage around $210 billion.59
Another example is Meteo Protect, which offers a parametric
insurance policy to French wine makers using the trigger of cold
temperature during the growing period.60 The policy was adopted
after France saw a severe temperature drop during the critical
growing season of 2017 that affected nearly every one of its
vineyards.61 The “prime wine growing region” saw a drop of 40
percent of their output and the country itself saw a drop in 17 percent
of its national output.62 Meteo Protect incorporates parametric
triggers that “account for the financial consequences of frost
severely damaging or killing grape buds, and for the decrease in
productivity which results from cold temperatures interrupting the
vines’ growing cycle.”63 Currently, 15 percent of the vineyards in
France are insured; only 10 percent of wine production, however, is
threatened and lost to natural circumstances annually.64
Yet another example is Beazley’s Weather Guard product,
which uses Weather Decision Technologies65 that “send[] . . .
58

See id. (stating that payouts are made once Swiss Re received documentation
from the Japan Meteorological Agency that the tsunami height rose above the predetermined level).
59
See id.
60
Meteo Protect Signs Up More French Wine Makers to Parametric Insurance,
ARTEMIS (June 11, 2018), http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2018/06/11/meteoprotect-signs-up-more-french-wine-makers-to-parametric-insurance/.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
Matt Sheehan, Spring Frost Drives Insurance Demand Among French
Winemakers: Meteo Protect, REINSURANCE NEWS (June 14, 2018),
https://www.reinsurancene.ws/spring-frost-drives-insurance-demand-amongfrench-winemakers-meteo-protect/.
64
See id.
65
Weather Decision Technologies is a company that provides extensive
weather data to other organizations by offering “specific expertise with big data
as it applies to hazardous weather detection and prediction, forecast modeling,
decision analytics, GIS, mobile apps and interactive mapping.” About WDT,
WEATHER OPS, https://www.weatherops.com/about-us (last visited Nov. 13,
2018).
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weather data to the client and Beazley . . . and if the weather
parameters recorded reach or exceed the trigger levels specified in
the policy, Beazley will settle the claim automatically.”66 This type
of weather coverage is beneficial for event organizers and retailers
who lose substantial amounts of money in the event of rain or other
weather mishaps.67 The agency is considering moving to real time
weather data to speed up the parametric process, but for now, the
process operates as efficiently as it can.68
The most prominent example of parametric catastrophe
insurance is the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
(“CCRIF”), which is one of the longest-standing parametric
programs.69 CCRIF is the first multi-country risk pool that provides
parametric catastrophe insurance to government agencies across the
countries involved.70 The insurance policy is taken out by local
governments, not individuals, with the purpose of closing the
liquidity gap that is seen when less economically profitable
countries are unable to respond to the natural catastrophe.71
Although, for the most part, CCRIF has been turned to as a model
for catastrophe insurance, its ultimate deficiencies are rooted in its
established parameters and the inequality between payouts and
actual harm experienced.72 Understanding the flaws in CCRIF’s
parametric nature provides insight into how parametric programs
need to develop in the future to be successful.
66

A reinsurance agency headquartered in London. Beazley Speeds Up &
Simplifies Parametric Weather Insurance Policies, ARTEMIS (Apr. 30, 2018),
http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2018/04/30/beazley-speeds-up-simplifiesparametric-weather-insurance-policies/.
67
See id.
68
See id. (stating that “[p]arametric triggers can be sped up even more if realtime data on weather conditions can be used, enabling payouts to be almost
instantaneous, once the weather data is delivered to an app or other technology
platform,” but acknowledging that this efficiency would require widely accessible
technology and “real-time data inputs” that are being developed currently).
69
See Lauren Brooks, The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility:
Parametric Insurance Payouts Without Proper Parameters, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 135, 149 (2011).
70
See id. at 139.
71
See id.
72
Id. at 149.
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CCRIF’s models and parameters in the agreements were based
largely on assumptions because “Caribbean exposure data did not
exist at the time the parametric equations were developed . . .”73 The
parameters were not based on tangible data, so the ability to generate
a fair payout was inhibited.74 When payouts do not align with the
actual harm, two inequalities emerge: first, if the model releases an
overpayment for a loss that didn’t occur, the other countries in the
risk pool suffer; and second, if the model releases a payment below
the actual loss, the liquidity gap is not actually reduced and the
individual local government whose country is affected must find
another way to account for the harm.75
The latter concern was seen in 2007, when no payment was
issued after Hurricane Dean hit the Lesser Antilles islands and
Jamaica, causing hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to
agriculture and infrastructure.76 Hurricane Dean “failed to surpass
wind speeds and other thresholds to prompt payments from the
disaster pool[,]” and the affected countries had to bear the burden of
recovery without assistance from the insurance policy.77 This
73
Id. This is markedly different from the newer parametric insurance programs
for the Mesoamerican reef, French wine makers, and Japanese businesses where
extensive data about the risks and environmental catastrophes has been collected
and implemented into the policies. See Insuring Nature, supra note 3; see also
Meteo Protect Signs Up more French Wine Makers to Parametric Insurance,
supra note 60; Swiss Re Launches Parametric Tsunami Derivative for Japanese
Businesses, supra note 57. Further, it is extensively different from the predictions
from Beazley that real time weather data could be used for a parametric plan. See
Beazley Speeds Up & Simplifies Parametric Weather Insurance Policies, supra
note 66.
74
See Brooks, supra note 69, at 149–52.
75
Id.
76
Hurricane Dean: $3bn In Caribbean Damage and No Money from Its
Insurance
Policy,
BVIHURRICANE.COM
(Aug.
24,
2007),
http://bvihurricane.com/hurricane-dean-3bn-in-caribbean-damage-and-nomoney-from-the-world-bank/ (“The banana crop was wiped out on St. Lucia,
Martinique, and Dominica, and was 80% destroyed on Guadaloupe. The hardest
hit island, Martinique, is estimating storm costs of $270 million. St. Lucia is
reporting $18 million in total damage, and Dominica is reporting $98 million in
damage to infrastructure (agricultural damage may be another $100 million).”).
77
Id. (quoting a fund supervisor from CCRIF’s Washington office who stated
“[h]ad the storm been 30 miles to the north that would have triggered immediate
payment in Jamaica”).
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parameter issue exists because CCRIF requires an objective external
party to make the data calculations in pursuit of the fair treatment of
all governments in the pool, but the external party did not have the
appropriate data that specific individual countries had.78 Relying on
data aggregated from the individual countries would have proven
more effective, which appears to be a concept across many
parametric insurance programs.79
B. Addressing Concerns Regarding Current Parametric
Programs with Technological Advances and More Data
Gathering
Proposed solutions to assigning the proper parameters include:
(1) collecting more data,80 (2) encouraging local governments to be
in charge of defining the parameters for their individual locations,81
and (3) developing better parametric models through shared data.82
However, these solutions are hard to achieve because little to no
regulation of this new sub-sector of insurance exists thus far.
A few agencies and private businesses have begun to address
these proposed solutions. The World Bank created the Pacific
Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (“PCRAFI”),
which collects data models on a variety of environmental threats in
order to provide risk assessment modeling to Pacific Island

78
THE CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHE RISK INS. FACILITY, UNDERSTANDING
CCRIF: A COLLECTION OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 22 (2015),
https://www.ccrif.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding_CCRIF_Ma
rch_2015.pdf.
79
See id.
80
Brooks, supra note 69, at 151.
81
Id.
82
Nigel Brook, Parametrics - Building a Better Trigger, CLYDE & CO (Oct. 26,
2017), https://www.clydeco.com/blog/insurance-hub/article/building-a-bettertrigger (illustrating the idea of shared data amongst insurance programs with the
example that the Global Flood Monitoring System provides satellite data and
hydrological runoff as an online resource to use to map actual risk and stating
“[t]he more accurate modelling for parametric triggers can become, the lower the
basis risk and the more attractive parametric insurance products will be in the long
term”).
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Countries.83 This data provides more parameter points, including
data modeling through satellite imagery, topographic maps, land
surveying and fault data, and historical catalogs of tropical cyclones
and earthquakes to be used so that payouts more accurately fit the
actual harm.84 Another party addressing this concern is GEM
Foundation,85 a public-private partnership that created the
OpenQuake Platform, which is “an interactive environment in
which users can access, manipulate, share and add data, and explore
models and tools for integrated assessment of earthquake risk.”86
This collaboration of local and national data facilitates “innovative
solutions to inform risk reduction policies” by providing trusted and
extensive risk evaluations.87
Ultimately, the most technologically robust approach to solving
the parametric data issue is predicted to be blockchain technology.88
Tech industry leaders have predicted that blockchain technology
will eventually be able to increase the efficiency, accuracy, and
fairness of parametric insurance.89 Blockchain is the platform that
fostered the creation of the intangible currency, Bitcoin, and it now
functions as a “ledger that registers transactions and the provenance
of physical assets, as opposed to assets like cryptocurrencies that are
born and transacted only online . . .”90 The technology has been
described as “a progressively increasing list of records or ‘blocks,’
which are each, in turn, linked to the previous block and secured
83

Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative: Better
Information for Smarter Investments, PCRAFI, http://pcrafi.spc.int/about/ (last
visited Sept. 23, 2018).
84
Id.
85
About GEM: In Brief, GEM FOUND., https://storage.globalquakemodel.org/
gem/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
86
The OpenQuake Platform, GEM FOUND., https://platform.openquake.org/
(last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
87
What We Do, GEM FOUND., https://storage.globalquakemodel.org/what/
(last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
88
Carter, supra note 25.
89
See id.
90
Magda Ramada Sarasola, So Maybe You Figured Out What Blockchain Is –
But What Can You Do With It?, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (June 29, 2018),
https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en/insights/2018/06/emphasis-blockchainuse-in-insurance-from-theory-to-reality.
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using cryptography.”91 Blockchain creates a platform for efficient
data sharing through a “distributed ledger.”92 Notably, blockchain
technology has allowed for the continued development of smart
contracts, which evolve with each transaction subject to the code
and parameters established at its creation.93 This growth and neverending capacity will eventually allow blockchain to develop smart
contracts for a wide range of industries.94 The benefits extend
beyond increased capacity to include an increase in trust among
business partners and a lowered business transactional cost.95 This is
due to the “shared version of the truth” that is visible to everyone
through the ledger.96
“Parametric insurance coverage is typically used for difficult-toinsure risks,”97 and the adoption of blockchain would allow all
claims, insurer payouts, adjustments, and trigger data to be collected
in one place and automatically performed.98 Weather data could be
collected consistently and automatically stored in blockchain, which
would utilize the smart contracts’ function to adjust rates and risks
based on the influx of new data points.99 If parametric contracts
began to work with blockchain, they would become “immutable,
self-executing pieces of code sitting on a transparent and auditable
shared ledger.”100 Not only would this allow for a more accurate
policy, but it would make the whole industry more transparent and
more responsive to market and environmental pressures.101

91
Scott A. McKinney, Rachel Landy & Rachel Wilka, Smart Contracts,
Blockchain, and the Next Frontier of Transactional Law, 13 WASH. J.L. TECH. &
ARTS 313, 318 (2018).
92
About Us: What Does Blockchain Do For Us?, B3I, https://b3i.tech/aboutus.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2018) [hereinafter What Does Blockchain Do For
Us?].
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
See id.
96
See id.
97
Carter, supra note 25.
98
Id.
99
See About Us: What Does Blockchain Do For Us?, supra note 92.
100
Sarasola, supra note 90.
101
Id.
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C. Implementation of Blockchain Technology in Insurance
Programs as a Way to Increase Efficiency and Transparency
Already, insurers have begun implementing blockchain
technology into the insurance industry.102 Insurwave was created by
blockchain developer Guardtime and uses Microsoft Azure
technology and ACORD data standards.103 The policy provides $30
billion-worth of marine insurance104 to abate the risks of more than
1,000 commercial vessels.105 The blockchain technology was
adopted for this insurance program because it will “support more
than half a million automated ledger transactions” and will share
data in real time in order to settle transactions “using computer
algorithms, with no need for third-party verification.”106
There is a notable difference between traditional marine
insurance and parametric insurance as marine insurance is grounded
in the actual losses accrued rather than the conditions requisite of
such loss happening.107 However, the creation of Insurwave shows
the industry trend towards adopting new technology as a way to
increase efficiency and transparency among parties. This illustrates
new benefits for the industry and consumers, but also creates legal
challenges that suggest a need to solidify regulation before the
industry becomes unmanageable.
102

Andrew G. Simpson, First Blockchain for Marine Insurance Now Running,
INS. J. (May 25, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/
2018/05/25/490345.htm.
103
See id. Microsoft Azure is a “set of cloud services” that allows access to a
global network of business models, applications, and services. What is Azure?,
MICROSOFT AZURE, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/overview/what-is-azure/
(last visited Oct. 29, 2018). ACORD carries the objective of enabling “efficient
and effective flow of data among all stakeholders across the insurance value
chain” and has set standards that “allow industry stakeholders to exchange and
use data for their own needs regardless of how it was created or collected.” Why
Standards?,
ACORD,
https://www.acord.org/standards-architecture/whystandards (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
104
Marine
Insurance,
INT’L
RISK
MGMT.
INST.,
INC.,
https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/marine-insurance (last visited
Oct. 13, 2018).
105
See Simpson, supra note 102.
106
See id.
107
See generally ROBERT H. JERRY & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 615–19 (LexisNexis 5th ed. 2012).
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One such potential benefit is the simplification of increased data
sharing that companies and agencies have already begun to adopt.108
Concerns that the parametric programs, such as CCRIF, have faced
due to lack of information would no longer be an issue because any
approved local entity could collect data to be aggregated on
blockchain technology. Then parametric insurance contracts would
become more effective and more responsive to the actual risks
facing the insured entity. For instance, as climate change continues
to occur, the likelihood of storm surges or temperature changes is
likely to fluctuate inconsistently, especially when compared to
historical data.109 While “traditional” parametric insurance would
rely on the historical data to estimate predictions and set parameters,
parametric insurance utilizing blockchain would be able to adjust
those parameters in real time to account for climate change and to
create payouts that are more accurate and consistent with the actual
damage.110
Although blockchain technology has the potential to solve
problems posed by current parametric regimes, it has inspired
discussion among legal scholars because of its rapid growth and lack
of regulation.111 Strongly debated issues include: liability when
blockchain goes wrong; bankruptcy or other insolvency concerns;
anonymity and privacy threats; and whether smart contracts are even
legally enforceable contracts.112 Further issues involve the actual
information that is being used, and the bias that a developer may
108

See About Us: What Does Blockchain Do For Us?, supra note 92.
See Global Warming and Hurricanes: An Overview of Current Research
Results, GEOPHYSICAL FLUID DYNAMICS LAB., https://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/
global-warming-and-hurricanes/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) (stating that cycling
rainfall will increase as well as the intensities of storms and concluding that there
will be an increase in “very intense (category 4 and 5) tropical cyclones”).
110
This serves both the insured and the insurer, as it was noted that one
limitation on the CCRIF policy was that payouts had at times been more than the
damage actually caused. See Brooks, supra note 69, at 149.
111
Bryce Suzuki, Todd Taylor & Gary Marchant, Blockchain: How It Will
Change Your Legal Practice, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Feb. 2018, at 18 (“Regulatory issues
will be important for blockchain—to provide adequate oversight without stifling
or unduly constraining innovative new uses of the technology. Premature or
unduly rigid regulation could hamper the development of blockchain.”).
112
See id.
109
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bring to the program.113 Technology such as blockchain and
programs such as PCRAFI and OpenQuake solve the lack of data
issue, which fosters a space for accurate parametric insurance to
thrive.114 However, because of the lack of clear legal standards,
government regulatory oversight beyond what is already at play in
the traditional insurance regime will be needed to ensure that all
parties are protected and to detail who will be liable when something
eventually goes wrong.
IV. HOW THE TRADITIONAL INSURANCE REGIME PRESENTS
CHALLENGES FOR PARAMETRIC INSURANCE: SIGNALING THAT A
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC REGULATORY STANDARD MIGHT SERVE
BEST
Because parametric insurance is a sub-sector of the insurance
field, only private activities have guided its development.115 Further,
as stated earlier, no cases have been litigated involving parametric
insurance, especially in relation to insuring natural assets.116 The
insurance industry faces its own regulations, but those regulations
operate with the assumption that the indemnification process will
occur creating significant discord in advancing policies and
traditional law.117
The insurance industry is regulated largely by states with limited
oversight by the federal government.118 Although the industry
originally faced regulation through state corporate charters and
accompanying corporate laws, the McCarran-Ferguson Act119
formally established the state-federal relationship saying that “[n]o
person shall engage in the business of insurance in a State as
principal or agent unless such person is licensed as required by the
appropriate insurance regulator of such State in accordance with the

113

See Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 387
(2017).
114
See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
115
See Konsta, supra note 56.
116
See id.
117
See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 107, at 60–65.
118
See id. at 61.
119
15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2017).
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relevant State insurance law . . . .”120 Further, the Act provided that,
subject to a few exceptions, no State shall act to invalidate or impair
the business of insurance.121 Essentially, insurance companies must
abide by state law with federal oversight unless insurers are not
within the business of insurance,122 in which case those companies
would have federal oversight due to the commerce clause.123
In an attempt to serve the public interest, state regulation of the
insurance industry covers rate regulation, insurer solvency, unfair
practices, and insurer overreaching.124 The objectives given to state
legislatures are to ensure fair and reasonable prices, to protect the
industry from insolvency, and to guarantee public access to
coverage.125 Although states predominantly govern the regulation of
insurance, The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
has created model rules and regulations for states to adopt or courts
to assess when making decisions.126
Most insurance claims are ground in basic contract and tort law
where certain doctrines pervade, but these doctrines do not
effectively translate to technology-based insurance policies.127 The
doctrine of reasonable expectations, for example, states that “courts
have to determine what the weaker contracting party could
legitimately expect by way of services according to the enterpriser’s
‘calling,’ and to what extent the stronger party disappointed
reasonable expectations based on the typical life situation.”128
120

Id. § 6701(b).
Id. § 6701(d)(1).
122
See Richard Cordero, Annotation, Exemption or Immunity from Federal
Antitrust Liability Under McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-1013)
and State Action and Noerr-Pennington Doctrines For Business of Insurance and
Persons Engaged in It, 116 A.L.R. Fed. 163, § 3 (1993) (“[T]hat term is most
naturally read to refer to mercantile transactions, buying and selling, and traffic,
so that it does not mean a commercial or industrial establishment, enterprise, or
single entity . . . the core of ‘the business of insurance’ [is] the relationship
between an insurer and its insured, the type of policy that can be issued and the
liability under it, as well as the policy’s interpretation and enforcement.”).
123
See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 107, at 68.
124
See id. at 90–94.
125
See id. at 89.
126
See id. at 101.
127
See id. at 143.
128
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
121
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Traditionally, this doctrine would analyze the power balance of the
two contracting parties and the document agreed upon, which would
completely describe the indemnification process and the outcome
would be concrete enough to put in words. In parametric insurance
plans, however, the outcome is much less concrete and determinate
upon weather patterns. This can affect what reasonable parties
assume the outcome to be and might frustrate the common law
application of that doctrine. Further, many more parties are
indirectly involved in carrying out the parametric insurance that
could substantially affect the power balance and reasonable
expectations.
The way that smart technology, like that used in parametric
insurance, is programmed can have an extensive influence on the
result because all programs inherently contain the bias of those who
developed it.129 This concept alone throws a wrench in the way that
traditional insurance doctrines apply to parametric insurance. For
example, if technology used to measure aggregated wind speed and
future weather predictions contains the bias of the developer, an
insured might or might not still have a reasonable expectation of
services that could shape a claim against the insurer who hired the
developer or even the developer itself. As technology becomes more
present and the understanding behind data creation becomes more
well known, it might or might not be reasonable to assume that the
technology will provide a near accurate read out of the actual
conditions present. There might not be a regulatory answer to the
situations posed, but more direct and specific principles and
enforceable regulation will allow for disputes like this to be taken
into contracting decisions.130
See Reyes, supra note 113, at 387 (stating “scholars voice concern over the
potential for technology to spread and institutionalize the bias of its developers,”
while discussing whether it is possible for lawmaking to increase efficiency and
write out systemic bias); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4–
5 (2014) (explaining that “[b]ecause human beings program predictive
algorithms, their biases and values are embedded into the software’s instructions,
known as the source code and predictive algorithms” and for this reason, no
programming can truly be unbiased).
130
See Reyes, supra note 113, at 426 (“As cryptolaw begins to take shape,
processes for rooting out such bias and increasing protections for individual rights
129
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The doctrine of liability for bad faith is also relevant to
traditional insurance law because “insurers can be held liable in tort
for bad faith performance of their duties to insureds.”131 Insurance
law adopted doctrines from torts because contract law doesn’t allow
compensation for anything outside the four corners of the contract,
including emotional distress that could arise from the emotional and
personal nature of insurance.132 Although the doctrine of bad faith
provides a way for the court to regulate the insurer’s performance
on the contract, it doesn’t provide assurance before a bad act or
catastrophe occurs, and it’s often left up to a court’s discretion rather
than the plain text enforcement of a regulation.133 The concept of bad
faith is complex in traditional application, and it only becomes more
complicated when multiple parties, technology, and weather data are
involved.
This is not to say that traditional insurance regimes could not be
applied to parametric insurance; in fact, they likely will be because
the concepts of fraud, mistake, and contractual penalties will
pervade.134 Rather, this is to say that challenges posed by the
parametric insurance field will require the development of more
specific regulation because of complexities such as technology,
power hierarchies between the massive insurance or reinsurance
agencies and the localized insureds, and uncertainty regarding
disproportionate pay-out related disputes.135

could be developed to prevent similar outcomes from infecting crypto-legal
structures by choosing the mix of DLT services best suited for that purpose.”).
131
See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 107, at 156.
132
See id. at 161.
133
See id. at 156.
134
See id. at 172.
135
See Reyes, supra note 113, at 427 (“Over time,[] an aggregation of
interacting crypto-legal structures with varying levels of autonomy will result in
the simplification and reconfiguration of substantive law and reconstitute the
makeup of legal actors in the administrative process.”).

DEC. 2018]Parametric Payouts and Environmental Conservation

99

V. THE GREEN BOND REGULATORY SCHEME: A PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
ECONOMICS COULD BE THE PROPER MODEL FOR PARAMETRIC
INSURANCE REGULATION
A lack of certainty about how parametric insurance plans will
play out in the long term has caused concern within the industry as
well as within the legal field.136 Although parametric triggers have
been used for more than 20 years, “legal and regulatory
considerations have slowed their adoption by the insurance
sector.”137 The hesitation in the industry revolves around the basis of
risk, what the insurable interest actually is, and how parametric
contracts work with the traditional indemnity principle.138 The first
two concerns are likely to be resolved through case law and
extensive data collection, because the way courts and regulators
interpret these seemingly broad topics will be solidified to a
recognizable pattern.139 The third concern provides an important
regulatory issue that will need to be addressed for parametric
insurance to be adequately implemented. Currently, most
governments require proof of loss and an insurable interest in the
loss in in order to receive a payout.140 This is the indemnity principle.
136

See Parametrics to Grow in 2018 as Re/Insurers Look to Resilience: Clyde
& Co., ARTEMIS (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.artemis.bm/blog/2018/01/11/
parametrics-to-grow-in-2018-as-reinsurers-look-to-resilience-clyde-co/ (stating
that there are “hurdles that the industry must overcome” because the industry
could be the critical solution to support the “desire and belief amongst the risk
transfer industry, and global development and resilience organisations [sic], to
provide those in need with protection against the world’s perils, many of which
are believed to be increasing in both severity and frequency as a result of climate
change.”).
137
Konsta, supra note 56.
138
See id.
139
See id. (“Although the way parametric products are treated in the law and by
regulators will evolve and become clearer as case law and precedent develops, the
level of support being given by governments around the world at present, together
with demand from buyers and the proven success of parametric products to date,
suggests regulators and law-makers will support and encourage the responsible
roll-out of parametric insurance in 2018 rather than attempting to hold it back.”).
140
Simon Konsta, Parametric Insurance: Closing the Protection Gap – Legal
Considerations, CLYDE & CO (Apr. 20, 2018), https://resilience.clydeco.com/
articles/closing-protection-gap.
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However, application of this principle inhibits the efficiency of
parametric insurance, and when the new technology-based
insurance is required to fit the common law rule of insurance, all
benefits of the program are overturned.141 Although some
governments, like South Africa, have adapted and allowed insureds
to “merely [] prove that some loss has been suffered,” rather than
prove the extent of loss necessary for the traditional indemnification
process, the full benefit of parametric insurance—immediacy—
cannot not be actualized. 142 Progressive regulatory standards would
allow this type of industry to grow into an innovative solution rather
than struggle to conform into an older industry’s way of working.
The paramount issue at hand is that parametric insurance uses
technology designed and programed by outside parties and often
aggregates extensive amounts of data in an attempt to make the
payout as tailored and fair as possible. This lends well to a
deregulated market. When advanced ledgers like blockchain enter
the playing field, this is even more relevant.143 However, the
seriousness of insurance, especially when the insurable asset is
contributing to multi-billion-dollar industries, requires that certain
parameters and guidelines must be developed in order to ensure
adequate application. If parametric insurance were to be considered
in the realm of green bonds and were to be regulated in a similar
fashion, the industry would be able to flourish at its outset while
companies and individuals would be held accountable.

141

See id. (“[T]he indemnity principle can potentially create regulatory and
legal challenges in jurisdictions where codified insurance law does not
traditionally permit ‘contingent contracts’, requiring instead that any losses are
subject to valuation.”)
142
See id. (explaining that while there is significant tension between
indemnification contracts that pervade across the insurance industry and typically
require proof as to the extent of the loss, countries that are attempting to promote
parametric insurance programs have begun to lessen their traditional insurance
law requirements to allow for the parametric structure to exist).
143
See Suzuki, Taylor & Merchant, supra note 111, at 18 (stating “[p]remature
or unduly rigid regulation could hamper the development,” but “[b]lockchain . . .
will continue to evolve at a feverish pace, with much of the work being behindthe-scenes investment by large corporations”).
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A. How Green Bonds Are Currently Regulated Through Private
and Public Regulatory Structures
A green bond is widely defined as “a debt instrument for which
the proceeds are used to finance environmentally-friendly
projects.”144 Like parametric insurance policies, green bonds have
the potential to make environmental conservation economically
feasible, but rather than being led by environmental enthusiasts, they
have been promulgated by mutual funds and insurers.145 Fixed
income investors support these funds, which can go towards the
mitigation of climate change146 or the creation of renewable energy
facilities.147
Similar to parametric insurance, green bonds began as a market
function without any regulation.148 However, since they first made
their entry into the market, industry has attempted to control their
impact in order to ensure effectiveness.149 Today, green bonds are
“predominantly regulated through private mandates”150 that were
created through private business frameworks and function in
correlation to government regulation.151 Private industry has set the
standards originally, but as green bonds develop into a more
recognized regime, some governments have begun to adopt and

Kevin M. Talbot, Comment, What Does “Green” Really Mean?: How
Increased Transparency and Standardization Can Grow the Green Bond Market,
28 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 127, 128 (2017).
145
See Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators: Green Bonds and the
Governance Challenges of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 1, 4–5 (2018).
146
See Green Bonds, IBRD FUNDING PROGRAM: THE WORLD BANK,
http://treasury.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/treasury/ibrd/ibrd-green-bonds (last
visited Sept. 23, 2018).
147
See Kerry Hannon, Should You Invest In ‘Green Bonds?,’ FORBES (June 29,
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2017/06/29/should-you-investin-green-bonds/#5b1034e348a4.
148
See Echo Kaixi Wang, Financing Green: Reforming Green Bond Regulation
in the United States, 12 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN., & COM. L. 467, 486 (2018).
149
See id.
150
Park, supra note 145, at 6.
151
See id. at 18.
144
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enforce the privately created standards.152 The structure of green
bond regulation has been described as:
[P]rivate governance regimes whose members are exclusively drawn
from the investors, issuers, ratings agencies, assurance providers, and
other participants and financial intermediaries in the green bond market.
These purely private regimes tend to reflect the interests of the entities
that control them. At the other end are private governance regimes that
take into account the interests of stakeholders such as government
agencies, social and environmental advocacy groups, local community
organizations, and other members of civil society. 153

These industry standards are not considered black letter law, but
they have authority among consumers and private entities, and most
green bond issuers abide by the standards created.154 This type of
flexible authority, known as the private governance regime, is
driven by investor choices and competition for perceived credibility
in the market.155 Private governance is not all self-regulation,
instead, “it consists of an amalgam of private frameworks that
operate both independently and sometimes in conjunction with
domestic regulation and multilateral initiatives.”156
According to the UN Development Programme, the
International Capital Market Association’s Green Bond Principles
(“GBP”) and the Climate Bond’s Initiatives (“CBI”) Climate Bond
Standards are the predominant regulatory standards enforced upon
green bonds.157 The GBP are voluntary guidelines that increase
transparency in the green bond issuance process and they include
the four elements: (1) use of proceeds, (2) process for project
evaluation and selection, (3) management of proceeds, and (4)
reporting.158 CBI has similar elements, but their regulatory approval

152

See id. at 16–18.
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(2018),
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requires independent review of the qualifying project and
implications before the board will endorse the green bond.159
The standards are facially voluntary; however, industry pressure
as well as increased awareness of the product have demanded their
self-enforcement.160 These standards allow for green bond issuers to
ensure credibility to their investors, but there is no legal enforcer of
the guidelines.161 Rather, the industry formed the standards because
they saw a possibility of exploitation and recognized that a single
fraudulent issuer could ruin the credibility of the whole industry.162
Although private governance regimes are the most common
form of green bond regulation, the private standards have begun to
merge with public regulation to create a more forceful governance
structure.163 Public regulation is administered by a governmental
body, but is less strict than typical command-and-control statutes
and regulations.164 Public regulation is typically still
“[d]ecentralized, flexible, and collaborative,”165 but it often provides
a coercive pressure on the private standards through agency
enforcement of quasi-regulatory activities, incentivizing
compliance, and threatening “that the government agency will
enforce private standards . . . .”166
One such example of public regulation is China’s green bond
market where the People’s Bank of China regulates green bond
159
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(Mar.
30,
2015),
https://www.reuters.com/article/green-bondsidUSL6N0WW16120150330 (stating “the [green bond] market would lose its
credibility if there were to be one incident where a corporate was deliberately
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schemes over time.”).
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issuance, listing, and other criteria.167 The transition to public
regulation was established to allow international practice of private
principles.168 The public regulation details a working definition of
green bond as well as selected green projects and categories that
qualify as green assets.169
As China adopts public regulation, recent studies have suggested
that the United States should issue command-and-control regulation
through the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) because
guidelines made “by a federal regulator will be difficult to ignore”
and would be able to force companies to comply with third party
verification steps and the other guidelines.170 China has adopted
formal regulation accompanying public regulation through their
version of the SEC, the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(“CSRC”).171 China, the first government to develop these
regulatory standards, now imposes penalties upon green bonds
verifiers who do not comply with the proposed standards.172 The
guidelines require a third-party verifier to have “professional
expertise in assurance, accounting and auditing[;]” liability
insurance; established procedures for quality control; and a
standardized verification report.173 The final requirement, the
verification report, must be made public to investors.174 If an issuer
fails to meet these standards, it will be forced to take corrective
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action, and if the failure continues, it will lose the green label for the
remaining time to maturity.175
The United States has not adopted green bond regulation like
China.176 As the green bond industry continues to grow, however, it
is likely that the SEC will have to take part in regulation or else
threats to the credibility of projects and verifiers could inhibit
market development.177 Without fixed regulation, legal issues may
arise that could be avoided through the enforcement of the private
guidelines already in existence. One such issue is that issuers are not
required to disclose whether their green bond actually fits the
standards or not.178 Another is that enforcement of green bond
standards are not something that is easily litigated because it would
be difficult for a party to establish actual damages if the bond turned
out to not be sufficiently “green.”179 No action has been filed over
green bond outcomes because of the standing issue180 associated
175
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with lack of actual damages. This only increases the need for
government oversight because the courts are unable to hear the
cases.181 A third issue is that U.S. Securities law grants a private right
of action to those who suffer material harm from untrue statements,
but if the green bond holder isn’t the one designed to experience the
effects of the green bond, she would be unable to establish
standing.182 These legal implications are what has led China to adopt
a nationally mandated enforcement of the private sector standards
and it’s likely that the United States will do the same in the near
future.183
B. How Parametric Insurance Regulation Could Learn from
Green Bonds and Model Itself After the Green Bond
Regulatory Scheme
Although a congressional act delegated to the SEC would
ultimately solidify the concerns with private standards across the
market-based product,184 similar to the outset of green bonds,
parametric insurance needs time to grow in the open market before
pure command-and-control regulation would prove beneficial.
Industry leaders are still debating how to best implement parametric
insurance programs across the globe,185 so while the goal ultimately
should be a formal regulation structure, private industry standards
should be adopted first. This would foster accountable market
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Id. at 16, 20.
182
Id.
183
See Wang, supra note 148, at 486.
184
An act similar to that proposed for green bonds could eventually be
productive for the industry, but the industry would need to remain deregulated as
the industry grows. See Breen & Campbell, supra note 178, at 20.
185
See Konsta, supra note 56.

DEC. 2018]Parametric Payouts and Environmental Conservation 107
growth without stifling innovative solutions to the insecurities of the
industry.
For example, one element of the voluntary GBPs used in
regulating green bonds is the “Process for Project Evaluation and
Selection.”186 The ICMA recommends that within this element,
green bond issuers should be encouraged to communicate to
investors “the environmental sustainability objectives; the process
by which the issuer determines how the projects fit within the
eligible Green Projects categories . . . ; [and] the related eligibility
criteria, including, if applicable, exclusion criteria or any other
process applied to identify and manage potentially material
environmental and social risks associated . . . .”187 The purpose of
these standards is to increase transparency so that the bond holder
understands what they are purchasing and what the effects are.188
In the realm of parametric insurance, this standard around
increased transparency would be vital to ensure that that policy
holders understand the details that have gone into building the
parameters and how exactly the payment will occur. A lack of
transparency could result in abuse of power by the insurance agency
in setting parameters that aren’t in accordance with the harm the
policy is ensuring against.189 Information regarding the technology
that records the trigger and historical data that has been collected to
set fair standards should also be released to the contracting parties
for the same reason. Further, if efforts are made to combat the lack
of data sharing, either through the allowance of local parties
inputting the own data, which was suggested for CCRIF, or through
the implementation of blockchain, information will have to be
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provided regarding how the data was gathered and recorded to
educate and combat inherent bias.190
While private standards should be adopted by a regulatory body
so that individuals are protected, third-party verifiers like those
sources aggregating the data for the parametric plan should be
approved through an agency like China’s CSRC.191 This would
ensure that verifiers are held to standards of transparency and
honesty, and the insureds have something to challenge if the data is
not implemented correctly.192
The discussion above is only one example of a standard
translated from green bonds that might yield proper benefits;
however, because cases involving parametric insurance have not
been litigated, there is still a level of uncertainty that these concerns
are what regulation should focus on.193 Past programs have
suggested that these issues should be targeted at the outset of
regulation, but emerging technology and the vast amount of
parametric programs that have come into existence suggest that
industry and larger regulatory bodies need to be flexible in their
standards.194 Ultimately, parametric insurance programs are posed to
be more affordable and efficient that traditional insurance and they
lend themselves well to covering natural assets that need immediate
and constant conservation.195 If the programs are able to follow
standards like that in green bonds, more parametric programs can be
established for environmental assets providing incentives for local
governments, policy leaders, and advocates to preserve natural
resources for the future.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Programs like CCRIF and other catastrophe insurance regimes
have been evaluated for efficiency, and like the field of green bonds,
most of the issues could be solved with a uniform system of
standards, adequate data collection, and both private and public
enforcement.196
Private insurance groups have abided by the industry standards
that reinsurers have adopted where third parties assess risks and
parameters for the insurance policies, but, as seen in the CCRIF, this
can lead to a lack of localized data and ineffective payout
mechanisms.197 Instead of having one global verifier like a federal
agency such as NOAA, if risk assessors and verifiers had to meet
standards similar to that of the CSRC, then localized groups could
collect data, assess risk, and report parameters for insurance
companies to use. This would alleviate the concern about objectivity
because the assessors would be held to the nationally required
standards. It would also alleviate the stress of a national agency
deciding proper payouts for a small local area for which data might
not be readily available.
Today, few jurisdictions have adopted regulation of parametric
insurance into their governing structures, and those that have are
dealing with the conflict between this new regime and traditional
insurance policies.198 As the world begins to feel the effects of
climate change through stronger storms and permanent damage to
natural resources, parametric insurance plans on natural assets can
incentivize local governments to protect rather than repair the
environment. Private industry has the financial resources to make
environmental conservation economically feasible, as seen by the
introduction of green bonds. However, in order to ensure fair and
appropriate use of those resources, regulation should be adopted.
This regulation should primarily mirror that of the private standards
in green bonds, which are self-enforcing standards of behavior.
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Eventually, to utilize the full potential of this tech driven industry,
regulation through a national standard like the CSRC should be
adopted.

